BENEATH KARACHI VIOLENCE

For more than two decades JITs are bringing Paharis, Commandos, and Motas on the TV screen, but analysts outside Karachi fail to understand why the fascist party is not losing its grip on the metropolitan city, despite heavy presence of rangers. Many of them consider that MQM does not enjoy much support in the city and elections only reflect the muscles not popularity.

For true understanding, one needs to look into the power struggle for this unique city and the insecurities of its inhabitants, who on the first place gave birth to this party. The current state structure does not allow elected representatives of Karachi to have any say on its matters. Having a say in federal government requires considerable seats from Punjab and for provincial government considerable seats are required from Rural Sindh. Also there exists an unwritten agreement under which Chief Minister of Sindh could only be ethnic Sindhi.

Beside this arithmetic one also needs to bring into equation the variable of law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in Karachi. Rangers were deployed here in mid 80s and since then, like MQM, they are integral part of power struggle within this city. Their stakes could be gauged by visiting University of Karachi alone, of which considerable land is occupied by this elite force. Even a conservative estimate suggests that more than 50% land of Karachi is cantonment or semi-cantonment area. According to few reports ex-servicemen are also involved in security and recovery businesses.

After 1972 Urdu-Sindhi riots these migrants from India started developing alienation with the state esp. Sindh Government, but the wave of violence during Afghan migration in 1980s gave birth to a party that was more about securing the Urdu speaking neighborhoods than to run for elections. In words of Nichola Khan "MQM offered security and protection, including from Karachi's highly politicized, corrupt and violent police force; militants gained power, respect and a perverse route to social and economic advancement when conventional routes seemed corrupted and blocked."

The militancy and street power of MQM constitutes a semi-state like structure for Mohajirs within Pakistani state, with sector and unit offices at Mohalla levels looking after the needs, from water lines to security. It is sad but true that people of Karachi trust sector-offices more than the police stations and government offices, as the state institutions are mostly run by the officials who are not natives of the city. The party fund collected, forcefully or by will, also works like a taxation structure.

Media reports of recovery of Jinnahpur maps in 1990s and recent confiscation of NATO weapons by the Rangers have not stopped Urdu speaking population to visit Nine Zero for resolution of their problems. It remains a more reliable institution than the Sindh secretariat for the majority of population residing in Urban Sindh. Duties are assigned to all elected members of the party so that the de facto urban Sindh secretariat have public office holders available for the public. Altaf Husain is surely not running a political party but a parallel structure for the urban Sindhis.

Despite such strength, this state like organization operates under constant pressure, as stakes of many players and communities are associated with this city. Party has a history of clashes with almost every major ethnic group as well as powerful military establishment. Its habit of raising Mohajir province slogan, whenever its relations with PPP hit low, has resulted in hatred between ethnic Sindhis and Urdu speaking populace of Sindh.

On the other hand the powerful state institutions fear that there are also separatist tendencies within the party, and even if not, strong connections outside Pakistan and the militant and street power makes it difficult to dictate them. This fear has not only lead to multiple operations against the party but often militant groups from other communities and parties are supported to counterbalance MQM.

As MQM handles the situation in a state like manner, coercively dealing with these communities and groups, it fails to find any support outside Urdu speaking Sindhis. MQM has often tried to broaden its base, even changing its name from Mohajir to Muttahida, but their retreat to Mohajir shell, whenever they face the heat, restricted them while violent clashes with other communities isolated them.

Karachi did enjoy a brief period of peace during the Musharraf period, as severed relations with PPP and PML-N, the two largest parties of Pakistan, forced military government to end its animosity with the MQM. With strong Governor as well as major ministries at provincial and federal level, and effective local government, neither MQM nor Urdu speaking populace needed out-of-state structure of sector offices for their needs. UC offices were there to perform those functions and interior minister of MQM insured that police remains subservient to the elected representatives of the city.

As soon as Musharraf left, and PPP and PML-N returned to political scene, elected representatives of Karachi lost all those privileges. Local Government elections did not take place once the term completed, Interior and other important ministries resided with the PPP who won the majority seats from the Rural Sindh, and soon violence returned to Karachi with new turf wars, where Peoples Aman Committee associated with Lyari Gang War and ANP were on one side and MQM on the other.

Zulfiqar Mirza's aggressive policies against MQM, despite PPP's willingness to work with Urban Sindh party suggests that establishment wanted to take back control of Karachi. With limited influence in federal and provincial governments and absence of local bodies, only strong state like structure of MQM is the hindrance in front of the powerful establishment. After 2013 elections PTI emerged as popular party that could be pitched against MQM.

Recent raid on Nine Zero, and constant state narrative against MQM coincided with PTI's onslaught is clearly a planned attack on former allies of Musharraf. Whether the aim is to clip the wings of Altaf's party or to completely eliminate them but the strategy would not result in ending violence. Crushing a political party does not crush the complex insecurities beneath Karachi violence.

Only a progressive alternate could achieve peace in Karachi, because crushing the violence require addressing the deep insecurities not only within Mohajirs but all the ethnic groups residing in Sindh.

@AliMantiq