For more than two decades JITs are bringing Paharis,
Commandos, and Motas on the TV screen, but analysts outside Karachi fail to
understand why the fascist party is not losing its grip on the metropolitan
city, despite heavy presence of rangers. Many of them consider that MQM does
not enjoy much support in the city and elections only reflect the muscles not
popularity.
For true understanding, one needs to look into the power
struggle for this unique city and the insecurities of its inhabitants, who on
the first place gave birth to this party. The current state structure does not
allow elected representatives of Karachi to have any say on its matters. Having
a say in federal government requires considerable seats from Punjab and for provincial
government considerable seats are required from Rural Sindh. Also there exists
an unwritten agreement under which Chief Minister of Sindh could only be ethnic
Sindhi.
Beside this arithmetic one also needs to bring into equation
the variable of law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in Karachi. Rangers were
deployed here in mid 80s and since then, like MQM, they are integral part of
power struggle within this city. Their stakes could be gauged by visiting
University of Karachi alone, of which considerable land is occupied by this
elite force. Even a conservative estimate suggests that more than 50% land of
Karachi is cantonment or semi-cantonment area. According to few reports
ex-servicemen are also involved in security and recovery businesses.
After 1972 Urdu-Sindhi riots these migrants from India
started developing alienation with the state esp. Sindh Government, but the
wave of violence during Afghan migration in 1980s gave birth to a party that
was more about securing the Urdu speaking neighborhoods than to run for
elections. In words of Nichola Khan "MQM offered security and protection,
including from Karachi's highly politicized, corrupt and violent police force;
militants gained power, respect and a perverse route to social and economic
advancement when conventional routes seemed corrupted and blocked."
The militancy and street power of MQM constitutes a
semi-state like structure for Mohajirs within Pakistani state, with sector and
unit offices at Mohalla levels looking after the needs, from water lines to
security. It is sad but true that people of Karachi trust sector-offices more
than the police stations and government offices, as the state institutions are
mostly run by the officials who are not natives of the city. The party fund
collected, forcefully or by will, also works like a taxation structure.
Media reports of recovery of Jinnahpur maps in 1990s and
recent confiscation of NATO weapons by the Rangers have not stopped Urdu
speaking population to visit Nine Zero for resolution of their problems. It
remains a more reliable institution than the Sindh secretariat for the majority
of population residing in Urban Sindh. Duties are assigned to all elected
members of the party so that the de facto urban Sindh secretariat have public
office holders available for the public. Altaf Husain is surely not running a
political party but a parallel structure for the urban Sindhis.
Despite such strength, this state like organization operates
under constant pressure, as stakes of many players and communities are
associated with this city. Party has a history of clashes with almost every
major ethnic group as well as powerful military establishment. Its habit of raising
Mohajir province slogan, whenever its relations with PPP hit low, has resulted
in hatred between ethnic Sindhis and Urdu speaking populace of Sindh.
On the other hand the powerful state institutions fear that
there are also separatist tendencies within the party, and even if not, strong
connections outside Pakistan and the militant and street power makes it difficult
to dictate them. This fear has not only lead to multiple operations against the
party but often militant groups from other communities and parties are supported
to counterbalance MQM.
As MQM handles the situation in a state like manner, coercively
dealing with these communities and groups, it fails to find any support outside
Urdu speaking Sindhis. MQM has often tried to broaden its base, even changing
its name from Mohajir to Muttahida, but their retreat to Mohajir shell,
whenever they face the heat, restricted them while violent clashes with other
communities isolated them.
Karachi did enjoy a brief period of peace during the
Musharraf period, as severed relations with PPP and PML-N, the two largest
parties of Pakistan, forced military government to end its animosity with the
MQM. With strong Governor as well as major ministries at provincial and federal
level, and effective local government, neither MQM nor Urdu speaking populace
needed out-of-state structure of sector offices for their needs. UC offices
were there to perform those functions and interior minister of MQM insured that
police remains subservient to the elected representatives of the city.
As soon as Musharraf left, and PPP and PML-N returned to
political scene, elected representatives of Karachi lost all those privileges. Local
Government elections did not take place once the term completed, Interior and
other important ministries resided with the PPP who won the majority seats from
the Rural Sindh, and soon violence returned to Karachi with new turf wars,
where Peoples Aman Committee associated with Lyari Gang War and ANP were on one
side and MQM on the other.
Zulfiqar Mirza's aggressive policies against MQM, despite
PPP's willingness to work with Urban Sindh party suggests that establishment
wanted to take back control of Karachi. With limited influence in federal and
provincial governments and absence of local bodies, only strong state like
structure of MQM is the hindrance in front of the powerful establishment. After
2013 elections PTI emerged as popular party that could be pitched against MQM.
Recent raid on Nine Zero, and constant state narrative
against MQM coincided with PTI's onslaught is clearly a planned attack on
former allies of Musharraf. Whether the aim is to clip the wings of Altaf's
party or to completely eliminate them but the strategy would not result in ending
violence. Crushing a political party does not crush the complex insecurities
beneath Karachi violence.
Only a progressive
alternate could achieve peace in Karachi, because crushing the violence require
addressing the deep insecurities not only within Mohajirs but all the ethnic
groups residing in Sindh.
@AliMantiq